




Neil Abrams @neil_abrams

Nov 7 · 62 tweets · [neil_abrams/status/1589725333536002050](https://twitter.com/neil_abrams/status/1589725333536002050)

Well hallelujah. After my many threads debunking his Ukraine lies—about the Euromaidan, the Donbas war, “NATO’s proxy war,” etc., etc., Maté finally responds to one of them.

In doing so, however, [@aaronjmate](https://twitter.com/aaronjmate) reveals just how far out of his depth he is. Let’s take a look.



[@aaronjmate](#) Graciously, he does offer an explanation for his silence. First, he says, my threads are too long. And you know what? He's right.

But in my defense, that's what tends to happen when you actually care about such trivialities as PROVIDING EVIDENCE.




[@aaronjmate](#) Excessive length is hardly Maté's only complaint. He also takes offense at my use of the term "tankie" to describe people like him. True enough; it is an insult. But it's one I think is well-deserved, as I explain here:



[@aaronjmate](#) Maté's final reason for never responding to me is that he objects to the format.

Do not doubt it, folks: He's got some absolute scorchers just locked and loaded if only I take the words and evidence from my threads and put those same words and evidence into a Substack post.



[@aaronjmate](#) Seriously, [@aaronjmate](#), that's some weak-ass shit.



[@aaronjmate](#) To the uninitiated, allow me to provide some background. Maté's responding to a thread I wrote on the Minsk accords of 2014-15. These agreements sought to end the Donbas war between Russia and Ukraine that began earlier that year. Here's the thread:



[@aaronjmate](#) After Yanukovych fled Kyiv in Feb. 2014, Russia occupied Crimea. It then tried to foment a rebellion in eastern and southern Ukraine. That failed.

[@aaronjmate](#) Putin then dispatched Russian irregulars to create a fake rebellion. That failed too. So he sent in the Russian army.

Receipts:



A screenshot of a tweet from Neil Abrams (@neil_abrams) dated October 27, 2022. The tweet is a reply to another user and contains a link to a report about Russian forces in Ukraine. The report text is partially obscured by a white box.

Neil Abrams
@neil_abrams · Follow

Replying to @neil_abrams

Russian defense expert Igor Sutyagin estimated that several thousand Russian regulars were present in the Donbas at this time, a number that would peak at 10,000 by mid-December 2014. static.rusi.org/201503_bp_russ...

Russian Forces in Ukraine

Following their increasingly large-scale, direct and conventional involvement in combat against Ukrainian troops in the middle of August 2014,³ Russian troops in Ukraine numbered between 3,500 and 6,000–6,500 by the end of August 2014, according to different sources.⁴ That number fluctuated, reaching approximately 10,000 at the peak of direct Russian involvement in the middle of December 2014. The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) had to involve 117 combat and combat-support units to generate the approximately 42,000 troops rotating in the vicinity of the Russo-Ukrainian border: either stationed there, delivering artillery fire against Ukrainian territory from Russian soil, or directly participating in combat operations on Ukrainian sovereign territory. It is noteworthy that 104 of these 117 units

3:57 PM · Oct 27, 2022


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[@aaronjmate](#) The entry in Aug. 2014 of thousands of Russian troops turned the tide against Ukraine, forcing a stalemate and allowing the Kremlin to establish the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics in eastern Ukraine.

[@aaronjmate](#) In reality, the two Donbas statelets were Kremlin proxies.

Receipts:



Neil Abrams
@neil_abrams · Follow

Replying to @neil_abrams

Leaked communications from Vladislav Surkov, a top Putin adviser, demonstrate just how meticulously the Kremlin micromanaged the administration of the “rebel” territories in Donetsk and Luhansk. medium.com/dfrlab/breakin...

organization was founded by Konstantin Malofeev, a quite rich and even more notorious Russian ultra-nationalist who has been accused by the United States and European Union of being a key financier and supporter of pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine.

The attached PDF contained a list of candidates for the government of the Donetsk People's Republic, including the Speaker of the People's Soviet (Pushilin), Ministry of Defense (Igor "Strelkov" Girkin), and other key officials. At the bottom of the document, a note says that the individuals with asterisks next to their name were "checked by us" and are "especially recommended." These individuals included Aleksandr Zakharchenko, who is mentioned as under consideration for the role of Prime Minister. Eventually, this came true, and Zakharchenko was "elected" to the job. At the end of the document, the author (presumably Malofeev or someone working under him) says to ask for the opinion of "Vladimir Ivanovich" regarding

This document was sent to Surkov on May 13, 2014. Three days later, on May 16, the full government of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic was announced. There is no direct proof that Malofeev and Surkov decided the representatives of the forming government, but all indications point to them having a guiding or approving role, as they reviewed a list of ministers days before they were officially announced.

The Surkov Leaks, as they have been called on Twitter since their release, show us a picture of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine that we have long suspected: the Kremlin had a guiding hand in orchestrating and funding the supposedly local and independent government.

June 16, 2014, Denis Pushilin sent an email to Surkov, with no one else listed as recipient. The email was titled "csmeta" (estimate, total expenses) and included a spreadsheet, entitled Smeta_Min_Presscentr_Gazeta (002).xls. Within the spreadsheet is an expense list for what appears to be a new press center, newspaper, and other expenses. The spreadsheet has three tabs, which are listed below.

First is a general expense list for a newspaper with three staff members (editorialist, webmaster), along with equipment costs (notebook, router, camera...) and printing costs (70-75,000 copies of a newspaper), and so on.

Ministry of Information, Press Center, and other expenses. The most important question is why Pushilin sent this to Surkov. While there is no reply to the message, it appears that he sent the spreadsheet directly to Surkov, and not to the Ministry of Information.

4:08 PM · Oct 27, 2022

63 ❤️ Reply Copy link

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
[@aaronjmate](#) With a weak and emaciated military thanks to Yanukovich's looting, Kyiv had to sue for peace. The result was the Minsk accords. There were actually two of them, the first signed in Sept. 2014 and the second, dubbed Minsk II, following in Feb. 2015.

[@aaronjmate](#) To crudely summarize, Minsk's key provisions called for an immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of forces, the decentralization of power to Donetsk and Luhansk (collectively known as the Donbas), and the holding of local elections in the two regions.

[@aaronjmate](#) Crucially, the elections were to be carried out under Ukrainian law, with Ukraine's involvement, and under international monitoring by representatives of the OSCE. As you might imagine, that's...not really Putin's kind of thing.

[@aaronjmate](#) With that out of the way, let's get to [@aaronjmate](#)'s response. It starts with the absolute howler (left) that Russia wasn't a signatory to Minsk.



I kindly replied with a screenshot of the Minsk II agreement revealing...the signature of the Russian ambassador to Ukraine (right)



[@aaronjmate](#) Then, after frantically googling “did Russia sign the Minsk II agreement?” [@aaronjmate](#) came back with another doozy.

On the left: Maté saying “ok so Russia did sign Minsk II but not Minsk I.”

...and on the right: A screenshot of the Russian ambassador's signature on Minsk I.



[@aaronjmate](#) Here's a link to the original copy of the Minsk I agreement, complete with the Russian ambassador's signature:




[@aaronjmate](#) Yeah bud, we know.




[@aaronjmate](#) What Maté's trying to do here is claim that the Minsk accords were solely between Ukraine and the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics. In fact, Russia was also a signatory—to both Minsk I and Minsk II.

[@aaronjmate](#) Maté's embarrassing ignorance of these Wikipedia-level basics isn't even the biggest problem with his account. Rather it's that, in an effort to obfuscate his own indefensible position on the issue, he bases his entire rebuttal of me on something I never said.


[@aaronjmate](#) Take a look below. Do you notice a difference between what I said in my original tweet and what Maté, in his quote-tweet, claims I said?



[@aaronjmate](#) Did I say that Ukraine is "not at fault" for the failure of the Minsk accords? I do not. I said that Ukraine isn't the *only* side that's at fault. You don't have to be a master logician to understand that I'm actually acknowledging Ukraine's role in Minsk's failure.




[@aaronjmate](#) Why do I consider it important to note that Ukraine isn't alone in having violated the Minsk accords? Because Maté has repeatedly stated otherwise.



[@aaronjmate](#) You see, by insisting Russia's invasion could have been avoided—and that peace can still be achieved—if only Ukraine complied with Minsk is Maté's way of gaslighting people into believing the moral onus for the war falls on Ukraine instead of Russia. It doesn't.

[@aaronjmate](#) In his response to me, Maté again places the burden of implementing Minsk on Ukraine. In doing so, he's mindlessly repeating Russia's own propaganda on the issue, which is that Minsk's failure to explicitly mention Russia means Russia has no obligations to ensure compliance.



[@aaronjmate](#) Russia and, in turn, Maté, want the world to think that Minsk merely aims to resolve an internal conflict between Kyiv and the two “separatist republics” in Donetsk and Luhansk. As for Russia itself, Maté contends that it provided only “limited support” to these entities.

The Odessa massacre helped accelerate the then-growing insurgency in the Donbas region, the eastern Ukrainian region dominated by ethnic Russians. Unwilling to live under a US-installed coup government led by far-right nationalists, rebels in Donetsk and Luhansk took up arms in the spring of 2014 with [Russia's limited support](#).

[@aaronjmate](#) Here's where Maté makes that claim:




By using Ukraine to fight Russia, the US provoked Putin's war


After backing a far-right coup in 2014, the US has fueled a proxy war in eastern Ukraine that has left 14,000 dead. Russia's invasion is an illegal and catastrophic response.

<https://mate.substack.com/p/by-using-ukraine-to-fight-russia>

[@aaronjmate](#) As I've repeatedly shown, the idea that Russia's support for its Donbas proxies was "limited" is demonstrably false.




Neil Abrams
@neil_abrams · [Follow](#)






Replying to @neil_abrams

The OSCE, whose representatives have been observing events on the ground in the Donbas since 2014, documented the presence there of thousands of Russian soldiers. [osce.usmission.gov/russias-ongoing...](https://osce.usmission.gov/russias-ongoing/)


jamming station, and the Orlan-10 drone. Nor has Russia ever acknowledged the tens of thousands of persons in military-style dress, whom the OSCE Border Observation Mission has seen cross into Russia-controlled parts of Ukraine. Russia has noted that OSCE observers did not witness members of its armed forces carrying weapons across the border in plain sight, yet Russian soldiers have been observed bearing weapons in the conflict zone. Last week

3:57 PM · Oct 27, 2022 

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[@aaronjmate](#) Being that Russia established, financed, and controlled these “republics” from the start, Ukraine insists Russia actually is a party to Minsk—and it has a point.



Neil Abrams
@neil_abrams · Follow

Replying to @neil_abrams

Leaked communications from Vladislav Surkov, a top Putin adviser, demonstrate just how meticulously the Kremlin micromanaged the administration of the “rebel” territories in Donetsk and Luhansk. medium.com/dfrlab/breakin...

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4:08 PM · Oct 27, 2022

63 Reply Copy link


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[@aaronjmate](#) The key thing about the Donbas war is that it was an interstate conflict masquerading as an internal rebellion. Minsk grants autonomy to the Donbas “republics.” But since Russia controls them, “autonomy” would amount to Ukraine’s partition. Hence Ukraine’s resistance to Minsk.

[@aaronjmate](#) To be sure, it wasn’t *only* an interstate conflict; there was real albeit limited separatist sentiment in the Donbas.

[@aaronjmate](#) But even Russia’s own commanders on the ground admitted that the “rebellion” could have never lasted without Russia’s money, organization, and troops.

Receipts:



Neil Abrams
@neil_abrams · Follow

Replying to @neil_abrams

Alexander Borodai, the first “prime minister” of Russia’s proxy state in Donetsk, likewise admitted that the “rebellion” could have never survived without Russian support. khpg.org/en/1565889311

Borodai was one of the Russians who held the top positions in the so-called DPR until the downing of Malaysian airliner MH17 by a Russian BUK missile on 17 July 2014 prompted the Kremlin to swiftly replace the Russians with supposedly local militants. Borodai’s effusive words of gratitude in an interview to Anna News are worth quoting in full:

“I want to say that we are rather beholden to the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin. By we I mean those volunteers who arrived in 2014. We owe him that smallest of things – our lives. Everybody who arrived in the first half of 2014 remembers what the situation was like in the second half of July 2014. If not for his policy, if not for his decisions and actions, we would not be here. In the same way as that there would not be Russian Donbas, and the Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics”.

This is direct admission that the so-called ‘volunteers’, who were in fact heavily armed and financed by Russia, would not have held out against the Ukrainian Armed Forces without Putin’s “decisions and actions”. These were in no way calls to dialogue, but substantial Russian military involvement in a country with which Russia was not officially at war.

4:00 PM · Oct 27, 2022

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[@aaronjmate](#) That Ukraine hasn’t fully complied with Minsk is not some big secret. Minsk has been a giant clusterfuck from the start—13 provisions to be completed in sequence, starting with a ceasefire. Neither side respected the ceasefire, so you can imagine how it went from there.

[@aaronjmate](#) Anyway, not that it matters, but I ought to correct the inaccuracies in the rest of Maté’s response.

[@aaronjmate](#) Maté is correct that responsibility for the failure of #5 and #11 in the table below rests with Ukraine. But he’s wrong to say that Ukraine alone deserves the blame for #7 and #8.



Aaron Maté
@aaronjmate · Follow

Replying to @aaronjmate

Here are five failed provisions, in blue, whose failure can be blamed on Ukraine:

5. Ukraine granted amnesty only to its own forces

7-8. Ukraine didn't restore links or provide aid to Donbas; it intensified its military/economic blockade

Table 1. Overview of the implementation of the Minsk II

Overview of the implementation of the Minsk II (European Parliament, 2018)	Agreement Status
1. Immediate, full bilateral ceasefire	Not implemented
2. Withdrawal of all heavy weapons by both sides, establishment of a security zone	Partially implemented
3. Monitoring of ceasefire by the OSCE	Partially implemented
4. Modalities for local elections under Ukrainian law on special status of the Donbas	Partially implemented
5. Pardon and amnesty of figures involved in the conflict	Not implemented
6. Release and exchange of all hostages and other illegally detained people	Partially implemented
7. Safe delivery of humanitarian aid to those in need, based on an international mechanism	Not implemented
8. Restoration of full social and economic links with affected areas	Partially implemented
9. Full Ukrainian control over its border with Russia throughout the conflict zone	Not implemented
10. Withdrawal of foreign armed groups, weapons and mercenaries from Ukrainian territory	Not implemented
11. Constitutional reform including decentralisation, special status for the separatist regions	Partially implemented
12. Local elections in Donetsk and Luhansk regions according to OSCE standards.	Not implemented
13. Trilateral working groups between the Ukrainian government, the separatists and Russia	Yes, but limited results

1:58 PM · Nov 4, 2022



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[@aaronjmate](#) It is plainly false for Maté to suggest that Ukraine bears sole responsibility for obstructing the delivery of humanitarian aid to Russia's Donbas proxy statelets (referenced below as NGCAs, or Non-Government-Controlled Areas). Russia itself has blocked delivery routinely.

2 Shrinking access

The ability of people to access humanitarian goods and services has deteriorated in 2017. The Government has introduced additional controls on crossing the 'contact line', whilst the de facto authorities maintain severe restrictions on operations in the NGCA. One of the main humanitarian partners was expelled from the NGCA in 2017. Freedom of movement in Luhanska Oblast remains severely constrained, with only one pedestrian crossing point servicing the entire region. Attempts to negotiate the opening of an additional crossing point have yet to achieve a breakthrough. The de facto authorities, despite continuous dialogue, also continue to require the mandatory 'registration' of humanitarian actors and programmes. Despite the many challenges, humanitarian actors continue to deliver humanitarian programmes in the NGCA, but not to the scale required to meet the critical needs of the population.

While humanitarian partners continued efforts to stay and deliver, humanitarian access - particularly in NGCA, where humanitarian needs are acute - shrank further in 2017. The 'registration' requirement imposed by the de facto authorities in 2015 continues to severely hamper the ability of partners to operate. In 2017, additional 'registration' requirements were introduced for humanitarian cargo and programming without clarity on the timelines and documents required. Despite constant efforts by the UN, the absence of a systematic coordination arrangement with the de facto authorities is another concern, which curtails the timely and quality delivery of assistance to the most vulnerable.

While the Government of Ukraine has eased some procedural bottlenecks, challenges remain. Taxation of humanitarian aid (organizations, entities and individuals) remains unresolved. After two years, the draft 'humanitarian law in times of emergency' still remains a pending debate in Parliament. In the absence of its adoption, there continues to be a lack of corrective measures to address access, taxation and other bureaucratic obstacles and impediments to humanitarian action.

Red Cross is the only international organisation operating in both People's Republics.

In the NGCAs: Access for humanitarian organisations to the NGCAs has deteriorated continuously since 2014. They must be accredited by the local regime and are subject to strict monitoring and control.¹²⁷ Only the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is able to operate in both People's Republics. A few other organisations have been granted access in the interim, but find their work permanently hampered by the caprices of the de facto authorities. Observers suspect that non-state organisations in particular are perceived as pro-Western and thus hostile, while the ICRC appears more neutral on account of Russia's

membership.¹³¹ Most humanitarian work in the NGCAs is done by local networks operating under difficult political conditions. These often avoid conflicts with local rulers by operating below the threshold of formal organisation.¹³² The growing isolation of the People's Republics severely restricts their access to humanitarian goods and services. For example, when Rinat Akhmetov's businesses were expropriated in spring 2017 the charity he ran was also forced out of Donetsk. Until then it had played a central role in supplying the population with humanitarian aid.¹³³

¹²⁷ Barbelet, *Humanitarian Access* (see note 106).

¹²⁸ Interviews in Kyiv, Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, March 2018. Some interviewees complained for example that while the Civilian-Military Administrations organised regular meetings with humanitarian organisations, they failed to follow through on commitments concerning implementation.

¹²⁹ UN OCHA, *Ukraine Humanitarian Needs Overview 2018* (see note 104), 11.

130 Humanitarian organisations attribute this to "espionage paranoia" on the part of those in effective control, and to their wish to prevent direct contact between international humanitarian organisations and the populations of the territories. Interviews in Kyiv, Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, March 2018.


@aaronjmate Sources for above screenshots:

https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/ukraine_humanitarian_needs_overview_2018_en_1.pdf



@aaronjmate Second, contra Maté, both sides, not just Ukraine, have obstructed the restoration of full social and economic links with the affected areas.

https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/ukraine_humanitarian_snapshot_checkpoints_20190517.pdf




[@aaronjmate](#) As for holding local elections in Russia's Donbas proxy statelets, let's get real. Russia *could* adhere to Minsk by holding elections under Ukrainian law, with Ukraine's participation, and under OSCE monitoring. But it will never, ever do that. Want to know why?

[@aaronjmate](#) The reason Russia hasn't allowed free elections under international monitoring in its Donbas statelets is because it's afraid—justifiably, I'd add—that it will *lose* those elections.


[@aaronjmate](#) Since there's never been majority support in Donbas for separating from Ukraine, any elections there that were actually free, fair, and verified as such by the OSCE would very likely yield the wrong result as far as Putin's concerned.

Receipts:

 **Neil Abrams**
@neil_abrams · Follow

Replying to @neil_abrams

The bias inherent in any survey done under Russian occupation can sometimes be revealing. Take this 2019 poll from the Donbas where, even in Russian-controlled areas, a majority *rejected* joining Russia. Imagine how much higher the true figure must be.

 **Dietmar Pichler** 🇺🇦 @DietmarPichler1

Survey in Donbas 2019 about the future status of the territory controlled by Russian proxies. Government controlled area were places Donbas like Mariupol, Kramatorsk, Sloviansk etc.

	Government controlled area	Separatist controlled area
Special autonomy status within Ukraine	31%	31%
Like before, parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblast respectively without autonomy	65%	24%
Part of the Russian Federation without a special autonomy status	2%	18%
Special autonomy status within the Russian Federation	2%	27%

Respondents were asked: 'In your view, what should the status of the self-declared people's republics of Donetsk and Luhansk be?'

Source: [Centre for East European and International Studies](#)
· [Get the data](#)

3:47 PM · Oct 27, 2022

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[@aaronjmate](#) If you haven't noticed, Putin isn't a big fan of free and fair elections. He won't allow them in Russia proper, and he sure as hell won't in the Donbas, either. Russia *has* held elections there—repeatedly and in violation of Minsk. But they were shams.



[@aaronjmate](#) Finally, Maté can spare me the pearl-clutching over Ukraine's non-compliance with Minsk. The only reason Minsk exists in the first place is that Russia, by invading in 2014, broke *its own* past promises to abide by Ukraine's sovereignty.



[@aaronjmate](#) Russia, and, evidently, Maté, would like everyone to forget that it pledged to respect Ukraine's internationally-recognized borders—yeah, including Crimea—when it signed the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and the 1997 Russian-Ukrainian Friendship Treaty.



Registration Number	52240	
Title	Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation	
Participant(s)	Russian Federation Ukraine ^a	
Submitter	Ukraine	
Places/dates of conclusion	Place Kiev	Date 31/05/1997
EIF information	1 April 1999 , in accordance with article 39	
Authentic texts	Ukrainian Russian	

[@aaronjmate](#) (taps sign)



[@aaronjmate](#) Look, I know I spend a lot of time debunking Maté's Ukraine nonsense. It's not just that I take offense to the atrocity-denial and the unmerited blame-shifting. It's because, compared with most tankies, he's actually pretty good at what he does.

[@aaronjmate](#) Like his fellow travelers, Maté aims to muddy the moral waters around the war by making otherwise reasonable people think that Ukraine is at least as culpable as Russia. The whole idea is to inject moral ambiguity into a situation that demands moral clarity.

[@aaronjmate](#) But unlike, say, Hinkle, Maté doesn't overtly cheer on Russia's colonial war. Unlike Blumenthal, he's not a conspiratorial crank. Unlike Tracey, he's not an idiot. He knows how to mask his lies beneath a veneer of credibility. And so reasonable people might buy into them.


[@aaronjmate](#) So I'll continue to call out Maté's gaslighting. He'll mostly continue to ignore it. When he doesn't, he'll opt to argue with a strawman instead of me. Because let's face it, when your positions are prima facie indefensible, you don't really have other options, do you?

/end

For those interested, here's a compendium of my various threads that debunk Maté's arguments about Ukraine, either directly or indirectly.

Receipts provided, as always. /1

No, the Euromaidan was not a coup. Nor was it engineered by the U.S. Nor was it dominated by the far-right. It was a popular revolution against ruler who had eviscerated his own legitimacy through his authoritarian, violent conduct.



Neil Abrams
@neil_abrams · [Follow](#)



According to tankies, the 2014 Euromaidan revolution, in which Ukrainians rose up and ousted kleptocratic dictator Viktor Yanukovich, was a "coup" by the U.S. acting in cahoots with Ukrainian Nazis. Was it?

Short answer: No



Long answer: Also, no.

Let's dig in.

1:45 PM · Sep 23, 2022 



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Here, I debunk the specific claim by Maté and others that Victoria Nuland supposedly engineered the Euromaidan.



Neil Abrams
@neil_abrams · [Follow](#)

Replying to @neil_abrams

But there's one tiny problem with the "Victoria-Nuland-as-Evil-Mastermind" theory. Ukraine has both a president and prime minister. Nuland & Pyatt are discussing who should become PM alongside Yanukovich, not who should replace him as president.

 **Neil Abrams** @neil_abrams
Replying to @xxcoldstelexx @Cdegroff10 and 2 others

You're really straining to see some plot against Yanukovich that, per the transcript itself, obviously did not exist. When Pyatt suggests outreach to Yanuk, does Nuland reply "No, actually, Yanuk must be replaced?" No, she agrees and says "yeah, let's bring Biden in on that."

international personality to come out here and help to midwife this thing. The other issue is some kind of outreach to Yanukovich but we probably regroup on that tomorrow as we see how things start to fall into place.

Nuland: So on that piece Geoff, when I wrote the note [US vice-president's national security adviser Jake] Sullivan's come back to me VFR [direct to me], saying you need [US Vice-President Joe] Biden and I said probably tomorrow for an atta-boy and to get the deets [details] to stick. So Biden's willing.

Pyatt: OK. Great. Thanks!

3:38 PM · Oct 27, 2022

 76  Reply  Copy link

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On Russia's "Novorossiya" myth, the staged annexation "referendums" in late-September, and the lack of local support in eastern and southern Ukraine for either independence or joining Russia.

Oh, and how Max Blumenthal is actually an imperialist shill.

Neil Abrams
@neil_abrams · Follow

I hesitate to call it a “mask-off moment” since, to have a mask-off moment, you need to actually wear one in the first place. But the tweet below is revealing of a fundamental truth about the man: @MaxBlumenthal—I shit you not—is an imperialist shill. A thread.

Max Blumenthal
@MaxBlumenthal

After the Soviet collapse, the US expected Russia to abandon the people of Novorossiya the same way Egypt betrayed the dispossessed Palestinian nation with its agreement to Camp David.

The US expected Russia to accept humiliation for peace and was dealt a decisive rebuke today.

10:45 PM · Sep 30, 2022 · Twitter for iPhone

1,011 Retweets 155 Quote Tweets 4,329 Likes

1:52 PM · Oct 5, 2022

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612 Reply Copy link

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On the Donbas war and the Minsk accords:



Neil Abrams
@neil_abrams · [Follow](#)

A common Twitter exchange:

Tankie: Stop arming Ukraine!

Reasonable person: What exactly do you suggest instead?

Tankie: Pressure Ukraine to implement the Minsk accords!

So what are the Minsk accords, and why is the tankie line on Minsk ridiculous?

A thread.

2:05 PM · Oct 21, 2022

[Read the full conversation on Twitter](#)

10K Reply Copy link

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More on the Donbas war, Russia's 2014 occupation of Crimea, and the anemic support in eastern and southern Ukraine for joining Russia.

Oh, and how tankie Ukraine discourse is basically an idiotic game of telephone among grown-ass adults.



Neil Abrams
@neil_abrams · [Follow](#)

A couple weeks ago I caught some flak from Caitlin Johnstone since I didn't offer any evidence when I pointed out the nonsense in her Ukraine essay.

You wanted receipts, @caitoz? Well, here are your receipts.

On the "moronic cynicism" of Caitlin Johnstone: A thread:

3:28 PM · Oct 27, 2022

[Read the full conversation on Twitter](#)

458 Reply Copy link

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On the "NATO provocation" thesis about the origins of the 2022 war and all the inconceivable things you'd have to accept in order to believe it.



Neil Abrams
@neil_abrams · [Follow](#)

I think this guy is arguing in good faith. But to believe that depriving Ukraine of weapons constitutes an "anti-imperialist" stance requires also believing Russia's invasion *isn't* imperialist. That, in turn, requires believing a number of things that are untenable IMO.

db
@dbessner

It's becoming clear post-Bernie that many people who positively identified as socialists/leftists are at their core left-liberals. This is fine, maybe socialists who emphasize decommodification and anti-imperialism need to ally with this group, but a lot of discussions ...

5:50 PM · Sep 15, 2022 · Twitter Web App

62 Retweets 69 Quote Tweets 1,618 Likes

8:58 PM · Sep 16, 2022

[Read the full conversation on Twitter](#)

518 [Reply](#) [Copy link](#)

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On why it's ridiculous to refer to Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine as the "NATO proxy war on Russia," as Maté often does.



Neil Abrams
@neil_abrams · [Follow](#)

Replying to @neil_abrams


It's like saying The Exorcist is a film about a doubtful priest's struggle with his faith. Like, yeah, not wrong, I suppose, but sort of misses the main story, which is that A DEMON INVADES AND OCCUPIES A GIRL'S BODY.

7:55 PM · Aug 26, 2022

147 [Reply](#) [Copy link](#)

[Read 4 replies](#)

On demonstrably false atrocity-denial by Maté and his Grayzone buddies:

 **Neil Abrams**
@neil_abrams · Follow

Replying to @neil_abrams and @KitKlarenberg


It's not just @KitKlarenberg who's calling into question Russia's culpability for Bucha. Other reporters from @TheGrayzone such as @aaronjmate along with unaffiliated Twitter Tankies like @mtracey have joined forces in this pathetic parade of gaslighting.

2:51 PM · Apr 11, 2022

70 Reply Copy link


Read 2 replies

On demonstrably false atrocity-denial by Maté's Grayzone buddies (cont'd):

 **Neil Abrams**
@neil_abrams · Follow

OK, so @MaxBlumenthal of @TheGrayzoneNews recently published an article claiming that Russia's bombing of a Mariupol theater was actually a false-flag operation carried out by Ukraine's Azov Battalion. Reader, this is one dishonest article, and I'm about to show you why. Thread:

10:15 PM · Mar 22, 2022


 Read the full conversation on Twitter

4.9K Reply Copy link


Read 238 replies


At some point I'll do a big thread on Ukraine's far-right. Yes, it's a problem. No, they neither control the government nor dominate the military. And it's kind of silly to constantly talk about Ukr Nazis without noting the far-bigger Nazi problem Putin's fostered in Russia.

For now, you'll have to make due with this:



Neil Abrams
@neil_abrams · [Follow](#)



 Summary of Germany's new finding that entire detachments of Russian Nazis are fighting in Ukraine, as they were during the earlier Donbas rebellion.

Turns out the tankies clutching their pearls over Azov Nazis are—stunningly—acting in bad faith.

themoscowtimes.com/2022/05/23/rus...


At least two neo-Nazi groups are fighting for Russian forces in Ukraine, throwing into question Moscow's claims of "denazifying" its neighbor, German weekly Der Spiegel reported Sunday, citing a confidential intelligence report.


The document shared with German ministries by the BND intelligence service does not provide the exact number of far-right fighters, but identifies them as the Russian Imperial Legion and Rusich groups.

in eastern Ukraine in 2014. Several reports have linked Rusich with Wagner, a shadowy, Kremlin-linked private military company.




Russia sent troops into Ukraine on Feb. 24 with the stated aim of "denazifying and demilitarizing" its pro-Western neighbor, ~~proclaiming with its usual bravado~~ Russian Imperial Movement, which the United States designated as a terrorist organization in 2020.

"Whether this decision [to join the conflict in Ukraine] was made at the request of or in consultation with the Russian leadership" is

8:39 PM · May 23, 2022 



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 270  Reply  Copy link

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And note, in particular, this:



Neil Abrams
@neil_abrams · [Follow](#)



Replying to @neil_abrams

The difference, though, is this: Ukraine had little choice but to rely on a few Nazis (along with anyone else willing to fight) to preserve the country's very existence. Putin, on the other hand, merely found Nazis useful as a cudgel against his democratic opponents.

9:42 PM · May 23, 2022 



 24  Reply  Copy link

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I also recommend this thread on the sundry Nazis and white-supremacist scumbags the Kremlin sent into eastern Ukraine from 2014 onward.

 **Polly Girl**
@nomnomcookieez · [Follow](#) 

(1/13) Six years ago, Arsen 'Motorola' Pavlov was killed in a bomb blast.

Being a russian citizen, he took part in the anti-Maidan protests in Kharkiv since March 2014 and then became leader of the "Sparta Battalion" and a war criminal.



6:27 PM · Oct 17, 2022 

 [Read the full conversation on Twitter](#)

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